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Animal agriculture is presently at the forefront of state and federal agricultural en-vironmental policy. According to United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA) documents, agriculture is the leading source of impaired river miles in New 
York and the United States, with animal operations recognized as a leading agricultural 
source of water contamination (USEPA; Cook). High profile spills from animal operations 
and the presumed linkage of animal waste practices to Cryptosporidium and Pfiesteria pisci-
cida outbreaks have further elevated public concern about agriculture and water quality 
(Copeland and Zinn). 
Responding to highly visible lawsuits against animal agriculture (e.g., Concerned Area 
Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, CA 2, No. 939229, 9/2/94) and the 1990 
Coastal Zone Management Act Reauthorization Amendments (CZARA), New York es-
tablished an Agricultural Environmental Management program in the mid-1990s to help 
farmers voluntarily meet environmental goals (Moore). At the national level, the recent 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)/USEPA Unified National Strategy for 
Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs) calls for all AFOs to implement Comprehensive Nu-
trient Management Plans (CNMPs) by 2009, relying on a blend of regulatory and volun-
tary programs (USDA/USEPA). In recent years, Congress has also demonstrated inter-
est in livestock operations (e.g., the “Farm Sustainability and Animal Feedlot Enforcement 
Act” (HR 3232) and the “Animal Agriculture Reform Act” (S 1323)), while voters in in-
dividual states (e.g., Colorado) have passed referenda mandating greater regulations on 
large livestock operations. 
Much public and industry attention has been devoted to “large” farms automatically 
designated by operation size to be Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs),1 
and hence subject to Clean Water Act (CWA) permitting authority. However, the “vast 
majority of AFOs are small” with only 5% of the AFOs “expected to be regulated under 
existing CAFO regulations” (USDA/USEPA, pp. 9–10). For the remaining 95% of opera-
tions, there is an explicit appeal to the farm sector’s “ethic of land stewardship and sus-
tainability” by relying on voluntary and educational efforts as the “principal approach 
to assisting owners and operators in developing and implementing site-specific CNMPs, 
and in reducing water pollution and public health risks associated with AFOs” (USDA/
USEPA, p. 10). The Unified National Strategy sets the “performance standard” objective 
that all AFOs, regardless of size, implement CNMPs by 2009. 
Despite the elevated policy interest, little is known about actual manure management 
practices on dairy farms—especially those that do not satisfy the large CAFO designa-
tion. To quote the Unified National Strategy, “there is insufficient data on which to base 
an estimate of the number of AFOs that have unacceptable conditions” (USDA/USEPA, 
p. 16). Even less is known about farmers’ attitudes and their willingness to participate in 
voluntary programs, a component that is critical to the success of national and state pol-
icy efforts. 
In an effort to address these critical information gaps, and to develop a reference point 
for future policy analysis, we conducted a statewide mail survey of New York dairy farms 
that focused on documenting manure management practices and investigating farmer 
willingness to participate in voluntary agricultural environmental programs. This paper 
summarizes the results from this survey and discusses the policy implications of this re-
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search, with specific attention given to those dairy farms with less than 1,000 animal units 
(AU): those farms that do not satisfy the “large operation” definition and, hence, are not 
automatically designated as CAFO point sources of water pollution. 
In the next section, we describe the survey. The third section documents the extent to 
which current practices on New York dairy farms correspond with desirable components 
of a CNMP—emphasizing the barnyard and wastewater handling elements that play a 
central role in the Unified National Strategy and focusing on farms with less than 1,000 
AU.2 Evidence from this section suggests that current practices on many dairy farms de-
viate substantially from desired manure management practices. The fourth section pro-
vides the results from a series of questions directed at measuring farmer attitudes and 
willingness to participate in voluntary programs at varying costs. Documentation of such 
attitudes is essential to assessing whether voluntary AFO programs will be successful in 
attaining performance standards for the bulk of animal operations that do not satisfy the 
“large operation” CAFO definition. The willingness to participate results are also a novel 
application of contingent valuation to the agricultural industry, as past participation re-
search has primarily focused on willingness to accept compensation in conservation pro-
grams (e.g., Purvis et al.; Lohr and Park, 1994, 1995; Cooper and Keim; Cooper and Os-
born). Here we address the more realistic policy scenario for dairy manure management 
in the upcoming decade—what are expected participation rates at various implementa-
tion costs facing the farm? The final section summarizes the research and addresses the 
question, can voluntary and educational programs be expected to generate adequate par-
ticipation to meet CNMP performance standards? 
Survey of Manure Management on New York Dairy Farms 
The survey consisted of a 16-page booklet, containing 41 questions, with sections on 
farm characteristics, manure management, handling manure, spreading manure, neigh-
bor relations, and land-use issues. The survey was developed with input from agricultural 
economists, agricultural engineers, dairy specialists, and soil scientists at Cornell Univer-
sity, and water quality specialists, extension personnel, and federal and state agency staff 
throughout New York state. A pretest/focus group with 14 central New York farmers in-
dicated only slight modifications to the pretest instrument. Drawing a random sample 
from a database of milk shipments in June 1995, 1,115 surveys were mailed to dairy farm-
ers in upstate New York in summer and fall 1997.3 Following widely used mail survey 
procedures, with an advance mailing, an initial survey mailing, a thank you/reminder 
postcard, and two subsequent mailings, 470 completed surveys were returned. After ac-
counting for no longer in dairy farming (83 obs.), bad addresses (37 obs.), and deceased 
(2 obs.), this represents a 47.5% adjusted response rate. Such a response rate is lower than 
the 50 to 70% standards widely adopted in contingent valuation research, but is higher 
than might be expected for such a controversial topic from an environmentally targeted 
industry. 
Comparison of the returned surveys with data from New York Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NYASS) indicates that the regional distribution of the returned surveys corre-
sponds closely with the actual distribution of New York dairy herds. However, the sam-
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ple distribution across herd size exhibits a slight upward bias. That is, relative to NYASS 
statistics, smaller herds with less than 100 cows are underrepresented in our survey re-
sponses relative to larger herds: the survey (and NYASS, 1997) distribution for 99 cows 
or less, 100 to 199 cows, and 200 plus cows was 71% (81%), 19% (14%), and 10% (5%), re-
spectively. This apparent bias may reflect the age of our mailing list at the time of the sur-
vey. This list consisted of farms shipping milk in mid-1995, two years before the mail sur-
vey. If one assumes that the “no longer in dairy farming” group was largely composed of 
farms with smaller herd sizes, this could directly affect the size distribution of survey re-
sponses. It may also reflect a potential nonresponse bias by smaller farms. Unfortunately, 
we do not have the data to identify the probable source of this disparity. Consistent with 
the tendency towards larger herds, the average milk production per cow reported in the 
survey was a relatively high 17,927 lbs., which compares with the 1996 NYASS statewide 
average of 16,423 lbs.4 
Responses to the survey were grouped according to actual and proposed federal wa-
ter quality regulations affecting New York dairy farms. While the USDA/USEPA Na-
tional Strategy automatically regulates large AFOs with more than 1,000 AU through 
permitting requirements, New York agricultural and environmental agencies are op-
erating on the assumption that all dairy farms with more than 300 AU could be appro-
priate for CAFO permitting (CAFO Information Package, http://www.dec.state.ny.us/
website/dow ). Nevertheless, participation in the permitting process for farms with 301 
to 1,000 AU in New York is still regarded as voluntary.5 Correspondingly, for the pur-
poses of this paper, “medium” farms are classified as those with 301 to 1,000 AU.6, 7 
A second group of “small” farms with 101 to 300 AU will generally be exempt from 
CAFO requirements unless an individual farm is identified as a “significant contrib-
utor of pollution to the waters of the United States ... [and] pollutants are discharged 
from a man-made device or are discharged directly into waters passing over, across, or 
through the facility or otherwise come into direct contact with the confined animals” 
(USDA/USEPA). However, farms with 100 to 299 AU in New York will still need to 
conform with the 1990 CZARA manure management measures for storage facilities and 
nutrient management. The remaining “smallest” farms with less that 100 AU are pres-
ently exempt from federal water quality regulations, with the exception of the “signif-
icant contributor” clause indicated previously. As noted, however, even these smallest 
farms will be expected to have achieved the CNMP performance standard by 2009. Us-
ing this classification, smallest, small, and medium farms comprise 41%, 49%, and 10% 
of the completed surveys, respectively. 
Components of the Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan 
While the specific practices will need to be determined at the individual farm level, 
the USDA/USEPA National Strategy has identified several components that should be 
accounted for in a CNMP. Here we investigate four central components of such plans 
across herd sizes: manure handling, storage, land application of manure, and record 
keeping. 
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 Manure Handling 
The siting and barnyard management practices are a central feature of any CNMP. Fig-
ure 1 demonstrates that for many farms, the use of barnyards and barnyard location rela-
tive to surface water would be classified as an environmental risk: 14% of farms have sur-
face water within the “fencing of the barnyard” and an additional 32% of the barnyards 
are within 300 feet of the nearest downhill surface water. While CNMP barnyard location 
requirements have not been specified, the farms with surface water running through their 
barnyards clearly have a fundamental problem, and those barnyards within 300 feet are 
likely be scrutinized by environmental agencies. Figure 1 also demonstrates an observa-
tion that carries through the remainder of this subsection, that environmental risks asso-
ciated with manure management practices do vary substantially and significantly across 
herd sizes. Notably, medium farms tend to have lower reliance on barnyards (p < 0.001),8 
and thus are less subject to run-on and runoff concerns. 
Figures 2 and 3 similarly demonstrate that management of animal holding areas var-
ies across farm size. Smaller farms tend to have adopted fewer run-on control practices 
(e.g., gutters and natural topography, p <  0.001). They also tend to have less investment in 
controlling runoff (p < 0.001), with only 15% providing some sort of desirable runoff con-
Figure 1. Percent of farms by proximity to downhill surface water and farm size. 
478 G. L. Po e e t a l.  i n Re v i e w o f ag R i c u l t u R a l ec o n o m i c s  23 (2001)
trol. Again, a large component of this disparity in distributions across groups is attrib-
uted to the relatively limited use of barnyards on larger farms. In addition to barnyard lo-
cation, animals can have direct access to surface water while pasturing or in transit. This 
form of direct contact also varies by herd size (p = 0.052) with 43%, 51%, and 60% of me-
dium, small, and smallest farms indicating that their “livestock have direct access to sur-
face water or cross a stream to get to pasture.” 
Storage 
Adequate manure storage is a critical issue in northern states such as New York, where 
avoiding saturated and frozen ground is difficult without 180-day storage capacity. As 
demonstrated in table 1, average storage capacity is higher on medium farms (p = 0.011) 
and the average number of days in a year in which manure is spread is lower (p < 0.001) 
than that for the other size groups. Yet, only 22% of medium farms have storage capac-
ity exceeding 180 days. And reliance on daily spreading prevails in all size groups, with a 
mean of 263 days per year across all farm sizes. To a large extent, the observed deviation 
in storage and spreading across head sizes is due to a greater reliance of larger farms on 
liquid manure handling systems (p < 0.001). 
Figure 2. Percent of farms controlling roof and barnyard surface water by farm size. 
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Land Application of Manure 
According to the USDA/USEPA National Strategy, “land application is the most com-
mon, and usually the most desirable method of utilizing manure” (USDA/USEPA, p. 8). 
From the perspective of potential land use, the average New York dairy farm in this sur-
vey has more than an adequate amount of land for applying manure. A commonly used 
Figure 3. Percent of farms controlling barnyard runoff by farm size. 
Table 1. Manure handling and storage 
                                                                                                   Smallest         Small        Medium 
Percent of farms that handle manure as a liquid or slurry  94  74  14 
Percent of farms by maximum days of manure storage 
No storage  58  46  39 
Less than 60 days  87  77  58 
Less than 180 days  93  91  78 
Average number of days manure is spread per year  274  271  185
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threshold for land application is 0.5 acre/AU, which is greatly exceeded by all farm size 
groups, with medium, small, and smallest farms having 1.85, 2.36, and 2.77 acres/AU (p 
< 0.001). 
In spite of this potential, New York dairy farms as a whole do not appear to have ad-
opted recommended practices in terms of soil and manure testing, calibration, accounting 
for manure in nutrient management planning, and application practices. As demonstrated 
in figure 4, a greater proportion of medium farms have implemented recommended nu-
trient management practices, with significance levels across herd sizes generally less than 
0.1%. The exceptions to this trend are the proportion of respondents who always or usu-
ally “surface broadcast manure with a spreader” (p = 0.676) and the proportion who al-
ways or usually “incorporate manure within 24 hours of application” (p = 0.206). While a 
greater proportion of medium farms have adopted recommended practices, it is evident 
that there is still a wide gap between existing practices and practices likely to be required 
by a CNMP for all size groups. 
Record Keeping 
Livestock operators should “keep records that indicate the quantity of manure pro-
duced and how the manure was utilized, including when, where, and amount of nutri-
ents applied” (USDA/USEPA, p. 9). However, only 73% of medium farms, 53% of small 
farms and 38% of smallest farms indicated that they maintain records (p < 0.001). 
Taken together, the above findings suggest that the New York dairy industry will be 
substantially challenged by existing and proposed water quality legislation in the sense 
Figure 4. Percent of farms implementing select nutrient management practices by farm size. 
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that actual practices tend to deviate from those associated with recommended components 
of a CNMP. Moreover, the degree of noncompliance varies significantly across herd sizes. 
Neighbor Relations, Farmer Attitudes on Land Use, and Willingness to Participate 
In addition to actual practices, a number of questions were posed pertaining to land 
use issues and neighbor relations. We also described a voluntary agricultural environ-
mental program similar to those proposed in New York, and elicited willingness to par-
ticipate in this program using contingent valuation type questions. 
Neighbor Relations 
With respect to neighbor relations, anecdotal reports would suggest that the typi-
cal livestock operation is under siege from lawsuits and neighbor complaints. This does 
not appear to be the case for the New York dairy industry: over 63% of farms had not 
received any “complaints from neighbors or local public officials in the last five years,” 
with significant variation across herd size: 39%, 58%, and 76% for medium, small, and 
smallest farms, respectively. For dairy farms that experienced complaints, the follow-
ing were categories of complaints and associated percentages of total complaints: odors 
(42%), roadway spills (26%), water pollution (17%), farm traffic (14%), chemical use 
(11%), flies/insects (10%), noise (7%), dust (7%). Only odor complaints were signifi-
cantly different across farm size: 66%, 42%, and 25% for medium, small, and smallest 
farms (p < 0.001). This focus on odors rather than water quality is consistent with “man-
agement practices” complaints to the New York State Department of Agriculture and 
Markets, but deviates from the regulatory focus on water quality (Rudgers; Bills and 
Cosgrove). 
Farmer Attitudes on Land Use Issues 
Likert scale responses to a series of opinion questions indicate that, in contrast with 
popular beliefs and property rights implied by a regulatory approach to controlling 
agricultural pollution, farmers generally do not believe that they cause water quality 
problems or that they should have to pay for installing water pollution control prac-
tices on current operations (see table 2). Response patterns to these questions tend not 
to differ by herd size, with consistent response patterns for individual farms being a 
source of water pollution (Q27A: p = 0.412), whether they would be able to stay in busi-
ness if they had to incur substantial environmental costs (Q27B: p = 0.134), and whether 
farmers should have to pay for environmental practices when they expand operations 
(Q27D: p = 0.221). However, a greater proportion of small farm operators felt that they 
should not have to pay for installing water pollution practices on current operations 
(Q27C: p = 0.042). Irrespective of property right beliefs, many farmers would be “able to 
pay” substantial environmental costs, with 27% indicating that they would “stay in the 
dairy business” at a cost of $50/cow/year. Participants in a 1999 New York State Bank-
ers Association seminar suggested that at least half of the “neutral” respondents would 
also be able to stay in the business. 
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Willingness to Participate 
It is clear from the above that the manure management practices on many New York 
dairy farms deviate substantially from what will be expected under CNMPs. The cost of 
meeting these CNMPs is expected to vary widely across farms, and may be quite sub-
stantial in some instances. For example, based on extensive field experience, Cornell Co-
operative Extension estimates that, in addition to per farm preparation costs, controlling 
barnyard runoff will cost $1,000 to $500,000 per farm. Nutrient management plans will 
be expected to break even. In recent years, the New York Agricultural Non-Point Source 
Grant Program has provided funds to individual farms to address manure management 
issues, with grants ranging from $2,155 to $419,050 for farms with over 300 AU (Wilde-
man). The USDA estimated average cost per cow per year to meet 1990 Coastal Zone 
Management Act requirements to range from $17.01 to $34.63 (Heimlich and Barnard). 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that implementation of CNMPs would be a costly 
endeavor on many farms. 
New York’s efforts to pursue a voluntary program and the voluntary/ regulatory mix 
proposed in the USDA/USEPA National Strategy raises the critical question of how many 
farmers would actually participate in voluntary programs. Here we use a “contingent val-
uation” survey method to estimate participation levels at different costs to the farmer. 
This technique has been widely used in the last three decades to place economic values 
on environmental goods (Mitchell and Carson; Loomis). Several studies have also applied 
this technique to valuing positive (open-space) and negative (water contamination) agri-
cultural externalities (see Poe for a review). Recently economists have adapted this survey 
method to estimate the likelihood of participation in conservation programs at various 
payments to the farmer (e.g., Purvis et al.; Lohr and Park, 1994, 1995; Cooper and Keim; 
Table 2. Distribution (%) of responses to agricultural environmental opinion questions. 
                                                                          Farm        Strongly                                     Strongly 
                                                                           Size         Disagree           Neutral                Agree 
Q27A. In a typical year, manure  All  7  6  24  31  32  
and barnyard runoff is not a water  Farms  
pollution problem from my farm 
Q27B. If my net returns declined  All  15  12  34  13  26  
by $50 per cow per year, I would  Farms  
not stay in the dairy business 
Q27C. Farmers should not have  Smallest  6  6  34  13  41  
to pay for installing water  Small  8  13  31  15  34  
pollution control practices on  Medium  4  15  35  25  21  
current operations 
Q27D. Farmers should not have  All  20  24  30  11  16  
to pay for installing water  Farms  
pollution control practices when  
they expand their operation
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Cooper and Osborn). Such a willingness to accept framing is not consistent with present 
water quality efforts. Rather, given limited funding and the large number of operations, a 
willingness to participate at various costs format is more appropriate to the current AFO 
and water quality situation. 
Figure 5 provides the text of the contingent participation scenario corresponding with 
the current policy situation. In creating this question, effort was taken to develop a con-
cise half-page scenario that closely resembles New York’s voluntary Agricultural Envi-
ronmental Management (AEM) program. Two central features of the AEM and CNMP 
program, individual assessments of farm pollution risk and voluntary management plans 
tailored to the needs and pollution risks of each individual farm, were explicitly men-
tioned. Corresponding to policy expectations that some minimum level of participation 
would be required for the program to be classified as a success, the need for “high” par-
ticipation levels was emphasized. 
Given this scenario, farmers were asked: “If you determined that the cost to implement 
manure management practices on your farm would be one of the following amounts each 
year, would you participate in the voluntary program?” Using a multiple bounded for-
mat described in Welsh and Poe, the dollar amounts that each respondent was asked to 
consider included 0 cents, 10 cents, 25 cents, 50 cents, $1.00, $2.00, $5.00, $10.00, $25.00, 
$50.00, $100.00, and $200.00 per cow per year. For each dollar amount, respondents indi-
cated their likelihood of participation in the program, with response options including “I 
would definitely participate,” “I would probably participate,” “not sure,” “I would prob-
ably not participate,” and “I would definitely not participate.” 
The range of “cost per cow” dollar values was determined by first estimating an up-
per bound of $100 on possible costs and then doubling this value to avoid any truncation 
effects on willingness to participate (WTP).9 A lower bound of zero was used to capture 
Figure 5. Contingent valuation scenario 
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“no net loss in farm returns” programs like that used in the New York City watershed 
(McGuire). 
Based on previous contingent valuation validity research, our analysis focuses on 
the “probably participate” (or higher) responses (Poe et al.; Blumenschein et al.). As 
indicated in table 3, responses at this level or higher are approximately 78% at $0, a 
proportion which is only slightly exceeded by participation rates in the complete cost-
sharing program in the New York City watershed. However, the “probably participate” 
responses fall below the median by $5 per cow, and approach 3% at $50 and above. This 
latter figure contrasts substantially with the 27% of the respondents who indicated that 
they would be likely to stay in business if they had to pay $50 per cow per year; thus 
there appears to be a broad discrepancy between “ability to pay” and “willingness to 
participate.” Such a discrepancy is consistent with the sequence of producer denial that 
has characterized past agricultural environmental issues (Daily) and the economic no-
tion of free-riding. 
WTP is likely to be associated with many factors, including the cost of participation, 
herd size, farmer attitudes, and socioeconomic characteristics. Due to the large dimen-
sions of the response matrix (12 × 5) and the need to control for various factors simulta-
neously, contingency table analyses, as used in the rest of this article, are neither appro-
priate nor informative. Instead, a multiple bounded approach analogous to the maximum 
likelihood interval modeling approach used for payment card data was used to model 
the “probably participate” response function (see Welsh and Poe). Letting XiL be the max-
imum amount that an individual respondent (i) indicates that he/she would “proba-
bly participate” and XiU be the lowest amount that an individual was “unsure” or lower 
about participation, WTPi lies somewhere in the switching interval [XiL, XiU ]. Let F(Xi; β) 
denote a statistical distribution for WTPi with parameter vector β. The probability that an 
individual will “probably participate” at specific dollar amount X is 1 – F(Xi; β). The prob-
Table 3. Distribution of participation responses across selected dollar values—percent 
(cumulative percent). 
                    Definitely          Probably                                   Probably Not    Definitely Not 
                    Participate       Participate         Not Sure            Participate         Participate 
 $0.00  58  20  14  4  4 
   (78)  (92)  (96)  (100) 
 $0.10  44  23  15  6  13 
   (67)  (82)  (87)  (100) 
 $0.50  37  18  18  10  17 
   (55)  (73)  (83)  (100) 
 $5.00  12  12  24  16  35 
   (25)  (49)  (65)  (100) 
 $50.00  2  2  12  16  68 
   (3)  (16)  (32)  (100) 
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ability that WTPi falls between any two cost levels is F(XiU; β) – F(XiL; β) resulting in the 
corresponding log-likelihood function 
            ln(L) =  
n
Σ
i = 1 
ln[F (XiU ; β) – F (XiL; β)].                                             (1)
where F(Xi; β) is defined to be the standard logistic function for the cumulative distribu-
tion function 
F(X; β) = 1/(1 + e– (a + bX))                                                        (2)
and a and b are coefficients to be estimated. These estimates were then converted to WTP 
functions following methods detailed in Cameron (1988, 1991). Combined, these statisti-
cal analyses allow us to estimate a “regression” function relating WTP to other variables 
reported in the questionnaire. 
In estimating these WTP regressions, the dollar per cow value was multiplied by the 
number of milking and dry cows reported in the survey in order to directly estimate WTP 
as a function of total, as opposed to per cow, farm costs. As such, each respondent faces 
a unique set of dollar values in considering his WTP. In the simplest case, we estimated 
WTP as a function of the dollar value and the herd size. The resulting regression coeffi-
cients were10 
WTP = –96.46 + 222.97 D101300 + 968.83 D3011000                            (3)
in which the intercept was not significantly different from zero but both the herd size 
slope shifters were significant at the 5% level or higher (see Model 1 in table 4). Holding 
everything else constant, this estimated function indicates that the average smallest farms 
would not be willing to participate in this type of voluntary program even if it did not re-
duce their net returns. In contrast, the average small farm would probably participate at 
a cost of $126.51 (= –96.46+222.97) per annum. Similarly, these estimates indicate that the 
average medium dairy farm would participate at a cost of $872.39 (= –96.46 + 968.83) per 
annum. Accounting for the size distribution across farms, the overall average willingness 
to participate is $133. 
Other covariates were introduced into the model in an effort to account for farmer and 
farm characteristics that are correlated with WTP and to examine the construct validity 
of farmer responses. These additional variables are evaluated in Models 2 to 4 in table 4, 
which hold the number of observations constant across models at the level associated with 
Model 3, the most complete model: Model 2 uses the limited set of covariates in Model 1, 
indicating that the restricted number of observations provides similar results; Model 3 in-
cludes the most complete set of covariates; and Model 4 excludes those Model 3 covari-
ates (D101300, Q27C, and Inoper10) that were not significant at the 20% level. While these 
excluded variables were not individually significant, the estimated coefficients demon-
strate the expected sign: whether or not farmers believed that they should have to pay for 
installing water pollution control practices on current operations (Q27C) was not statisti-
cally significant, a finding that seems to contradict the widespread “property rights” be-
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Table 4. Estimated multiple bounded coefficients, “probably yes” models. 
                                                          Mean           Sign 
Variable          Description         Value [n]        Exp.         Model 1     Model 2      Model 3      Model 4 
Constant  1  1  n.a.  –96.46  –42.12  –78.00  –45.93 
    (78.41)  (83.11)  (424.23)  (385.68) 
D101300  Binary: 101 to  0.51  ? 222.97 196.57 89.34
 300 AU = 1   [357]   (100.38)**  (105.80)*   (103.33) 
D3011000  Binary: 301 to  0.12 ? 968.63 942.75 596.29 551.83
 1,000 AU = 1  [357]    (186.15)***  (192.82)***  (182.45)***  (166.36)*** 
Q27A  1–5 scale: Farm 3.77    —   –99.30   –99.98   
 is not a water  [357]     (42.27)** (42.11)**
 pollution problem 
Q27B  1–5 scale: Not able  3.16 —   –80.88   –95.09     
 to pay $50 per cow  [325]     (37.02)**  (35.24)*** 
Q27C  1–5 scale: Farmers  3.61     —    –21.01  
 should not have to  [325]    (40.72)     
 pay for installing  
 practices, current  
 operations 
No-Complain  Binary: no. of  0.38 +    160.56  170.22  
 complaints from  [325]    (98.19) (98.27)* 
 neighbors or local  
 officials in last five  
 years = 0 
Inoper10  Binary: farmer,  0.62  +    98.04   
 family or partner  [325]    (103.57)  
 expects to be in  
 operation in  
 10 years = 1 
Age  Age in years  48.07  —    –6.79  –7.33  
  [325]    (4.38) (4.25)*
Milk  Lbs milk per cow  17,949  ?    0.06 0.06  
 per year, actual  [325]    (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
 or estimated from 
 daily milk production 
k  Scale parameter  n.a.  516.32 522.15 479.53 481.53 
 as defined in    (45.36)*** (47.49)*** (36.01)***  (36.03)*** 
 Cameron (1988) 
n     357  325  325  325  
–2 × log likelihood    1875.49  1715.20  1675.98  1677.98 
Note: * , ** , *** denote 10, 5, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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lief that farms should not have to pay to install environmental practices on their farms; 
farmer expectations about whether they would be in business in the next 10 years was 
positively correlated with WTP but was not statistically significant. Because of correlation 
in responses between these and other covariates, the exclusion of these nonsignificant co-
variates raises the significance of the remaining covariates in the “short” Model 4. 
Notably, as expected, WTP is positively correlated with the belief that one’s farm is not 
a water pollution problem. This finding is important, because it suggests some potential 
for an educational role in agricultural environmental policy in the sense that WTP would 
be expected to rise if farmers could be convinced that their farm contributes to water pol-
lution problems. This point is further explored in the discussion section of this paper. In 
addition, it was found that the ability to pay, as measured by the response to Q27B con-
cerning the farmer’s assessment of staying in business if additional environmental costs 
were $50 per cow, was positively correlated with WTP. Such a report supports the intu-
itive argument that those farms which are more economically viable will have a higher 
WTP. WTP was also significantly and positively correlated with production per cow, sug-
gesting that more intense milk production management may carry over to willingness to 
invest in manure management. Community pressures also appear to exert an influence 
on WTP, as farms that had received complaints from neighbors or local officials in the last 
five years had a higher WTP. The age of the farmer was negatively correlated with par-
ticipation. Overall, the models strongly conform with prior expectations, indicating that 
WTP does vary systematically across farmers and suggesting that these contingent partic-
ipation measures demonstrate construct validity. 
In summary, stated WTP behaves in a manner consistent with prior expectations, and 
estimated participation rates in a voluntary pollution control program at various costs 
to farmers is much lower than the expected costs of meeting CNMPs facing many farms. 
This latter finding should not be interpreted as implying that farmers have a low envi-
ronmental ethic. Many farmers may simply have reached their own environmental equi-
librium, in which they are undertaking practices as they seem fit. As such, they may be 
reluctant to contribute additional funds simply to meet the demands of the broader popu-
lation. Such a conclusion may be supported by the observation that a relatively small pro-
portion of farmers believe that they are presently contributing to water pollution in a typ-
ical year. 
Summary and Discussion 
This research provides key insights into the degree of nonconformance with recom-
mended CNMP best management practices, and the likelihood of voluntary participation 
to meet stated agricultural environmental objectives. Such research is critical because the 
great majority of livestock operations in New York, and the rest of the country, fall below 
the regulatory AU threshold associated with the CWA. Compliance with recommended 
practices on those farms that do not exceed this threshold will rely on voluntary and edu-
cational activities. 
The data from this survey indicate that there is a substantial gap between actual 
and recommended nutrient management practices for all dairy farm size groups. Many 
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of these gaps are fundamental. For example, 14% of farms have surface water running 
through their barnyards and less than 10% of farms have 180 days storage. It is clear from 
these data that farms will have to incur a range of costs to meet performance objectives 
stated in the USDA/USEPA National Strategy. On some farms, these added costs will be 
negligible. But on others, particularly those which will need to relocate their barnyards or 
install storage facilities, these costs may be substantial. 
Given these data, the critical question to ask for farms outside the CWA regulatory 
scope is, can voluntary and educational programs be expected to generate adequate par-
ticipation to meet CNMP performance standards? The answer to this question is strongly 
in the affirmative if adequate cost sharing is provided: over 78% of respondents indicated 
that they would participate in such a program if it was 100% cost shared. Yet, once even 
nominal costs are imposed, participation levels drop dramatically in a manner that is con-
sistent with the economic notion of free-riding that has prevailed since Samuelson’s sem-
inal article on public goods. As such, the results provided thus far suggest that attaining 
the CNMP performance standard will be difficult at best. 
Some additional insight on this issue is gained by disaggregating the data as in the ma-
trix provided in table 5. The rows in this table correspond with herd sizes used through-
out this manuscript. The columns indicate different levels of agreement with Q27A, “In 
a typical year, manure and barnyard runoff is not a water pollution problem from my 
farm.” Values within each cell are derived from the following regression results, where 
the variables and the significance levels correspond to those used in table 4:11 
                           WTP = 336.83    –    112.29 Q27A    +    208.30   D101300 
                                       (172.63)*       (41.17)***                 (99.28)** 
                                        + 945.60   D3011000     +     508.01 k. 
                                          (181.29)***                           (42.91)***                                                  (4)
As expected from the sign of the coefficients, the predicted values at which the median 
farm would participate rise with greater disagreement that “manure and barnyard run-
off is not a water pollution problem from my farm” and with herd size grouping. That is, 
moving within a farm-size group along a row from right to left suggests that, ceteris pari-
Table 5. Mean willingness to participate values ($) by AU category and response to Q27A: 
In a typical year, manure and barnyard runoff is not a water pollution problem from my 
farm (n = 357, probably participate model) 
                                      Strongly                                                                            Strongly  
                                      Disagree                               Neutral                                   Agree
Less than 100 AU  225  112  ≤ 0  ≤ 0  ≤ 0 
101 to 300 AU  433  321  208  96  ≤ 0 
301 to 1,000 AU  1,170  1,058  946  833  721 
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bus, WTP rises with the belief that one’s farm contributes to water pollution. Thus, if ed-
ucational programs were able to shift all farms into the “strongly disagree” category (i.e., 
recognition that runoff from their farm contributes to water pollution), average participa-
tion would be expected to rise. However, under the ceteris paribus conditions, predicted 
participation levels still fall short of the expected costs on many farms, with maximum 
values of $225, $443, and $1,170 for the smallest, small, and medium farms, respectively. 
It is possible that such ceteris paribus conditions are not appropriate when discussing 
the effects of education. Drawing an analogy to demand curves, it can be argued that ed-
ucation does not simply move perceptions along a given “environmental demand curve.” 
Rather the impact of education is to shift the environmental demand curve outwards. We 
acknowledge that such a shift is plausible, and, indeed, we desire it to be true. Yet behav-
iors are slow to change, and despite our wishes, we adopt a more pessimistic stance that 
there is a strong status quo effect in the bulk of the farm community that works against 
such a shift in demand. In Bayesian terms, strong weight is given to the priors or current 
beliefs. Along these lines we maintain that outward movement in willingness to partici-
pate will occur slowly at best. 
Given our data and estimated participation functions, we believe that our results raise 
a considerable challenge to present efforts that rely on educational programs and volun-
tary participation in order to meet stated performance standards on the majority of AFOs 
not directly subject to CWA regulations. Based on our analysis, it appears that agricul-
tural environmental policy in New York and elsewhere will need to extend or move be-
yond the present voluntary program approach to meet water quality objectives. Either 
substantial additional resources or an extension of regulations will be needed to accom-
plish CNMP performance standards by 2009. 
In addition, although we do not offer reasons for deviations in practices across the pol-
icy-relevant farm size groupings that we used in our analyses, it is clear from our data 
that different herd size groups exhibit systematically different levels of conformity with 
CNMP expectations. As such, our results suggest that efficient policy design will need to 
explicitly account for farm size. It is also clear that basic policy-relevant research is needed 
to develop an understanding of why these differences across farm size are observed. 
Acknowledgments 
Support for this project was provided by Cornell University’s Statewide Program Committee 
grants, the Cornell University Water Resources Institute, Hatch Project # 121-416, and Cornell Co-
operative Extension. We are indebted to Jane Maestro-Scherer and Survey Intelligence, Inc. for their 
work on the design and implementation of the survey, respectively. Any errors, however, remain 
our responsibility. 
Endnotes 
1 The CWA gives the USEPA the authority to regulate point source discharges, including CAFOs, into the 
waters of the United States through the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permitting program. In order for an AFO to be considered a CAFO, a facility must meet the NPDES 
definition [40 CFR 122.23(b)(1)] of an AFO: a lot or facility where animals have been, are, or will be 
stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12 month period and 
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where crops, vegetation, forage growth, or post harvest residues are not sustained over a growing 
season. Under the NPDES program, an AFO is automatically a CAFO if more than 1,000 animal units 
are confined at the facility [40 CFR Part 122 Appendix B]. For dairy, this is approximately equal to 
700 mature cows. An AFO may also be designated as a CAFO if there are 301–1,000 animal units con-
fined in the facility, and it meets special criteria as defined by the NPDES-permitting authority. In 
addition, any AFO can be classified as a CAFO on a case-by-case basis if the NPDES-permitting au-
thority determines that it is a significant contributor of pollution to the waters of the United States 
[ http://www.epa.gov/owm/afo.htm#cafo ]. Following EPA terminology [ http://www.epa.gov/
owm/afoguide.htm ] we refer to “large operations” as those with greater than 1,000 AU and auto-
matically subject to the NPDES permitting program. 
2 According to the Unified National Strategy (USDA/USEPA), a CNMP contains the following compo-
nents: feed management, manure handling and storage, land application of manure, record keeping, 
and other utilization options such as off-farm sales of manure and power generation. Our survey 
does not address the feed management or other options categories. 
3 For the purposes of this research, “upstate” excludes the New York state counties of Nassau, Putnam, 
Orange, Suffolk, and Westchester and the five boroughs of New York City. 
4 1996 data were used for milk production comparisons because the survey asked farmers to report their 
annual production for the previous year. 
5 The broad extension of permits to cover operations with 301–1,000 AU is motivated by the general prox-
imity of New York dairy farms to surface water and the Concerned Area Residents for the Environment 
v. Southview Farm ruling (CA 2, No. 93-9229, 9/2/94). 
6 Consistent with federal water quality legislation, the AU data used here account for all animals on the 
farm, including those beyond the main milking herd (e.g., calves, heifers, other livestock). The 300 
and 100 AU thresholds correspond to 210 and 70 milking cows, respectively. 
7 There were five responses to this survey from farms with more than 1,000 AU. These are deleted from 
the subsequent analyses, allowing us to focus on those farms presently outside the regulatory realm 
and only subject to voluntary programs. 
8 Throughout, chi-square statistics associated with contingency table analyses are used for discrete vari-
ables and F-test statistics from ANOVA analyses are used for continuous variable unless otherwise 
indicated. A p level of less than 0.10 indicates that the responses patterns across herd size groups are 
significantly different at the 10% level, and so on. 
9 The upper bound of $100 comes from early estimated costs associated with sequencing batch reactors 
designed to treat manure (personal communication with Carlos Montamagno, Agricultural and Bio-
logical Engineering School). Rowe, Schulze, and Breffle demonstrate that truncation effects are not a 
problem in payment cards if the upper end of the distribution is set at a sufficiently high level. 
10 Because of the Cameron transformation, the bid value does not appear in the final regression. An in-
dicator of the responsiveness of WTP to changes in this variable is provided in the coefficient on the 
k variable in table 4. In all cases, this coefficient was found to be highly significant, and thus, there is 
statistical evidence that farmers were responding to the variations in the costs of participation. 
11 For this regression n = 357 and –2 × log-likelihood = 1,869.48. 
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